我國證券暨期貨管理委員會在2005年時，宣布修訂「公開發行公司年報應行記載事項準則」，將原規定需分人分項個別揭露之董監事及高階經理人薪酬資訊修改為可彙總申報，其將管理當局之薪酬水準以級距劃分，並只需揭露各薪酬級距內之人數，不再規定需詳細揭露。 本文欲檢視在高階經理人薪酬揭露制度改變前後，高階經理人的薪酬水準與其薪酬－公司績效間敏感度之變化，並探討董事會結構及其監督能力強弱對薪酬水準及敏感度所造成之影響。 本研究以2002年至2008年台灣上市櫃公司之電子產業為樣本資料，經由實證研究分析結果顯示，在2005年薪酬揭露制度改變之後，高階經理人的薪酬水準顯著較制度改變前為高，高階經理人薪酬與公司績效間之敏感度顯著下降。本文從董事會結構觀點進一步探討其如何影響高階經理人薪酬水準及薪酬－績效敏感度，並發現，董事會規模越大、外部董事持股比例越高，越能減少高階經理人薪酬上升幅度，也越能減少敏感度下降程度；而總經理兼任董事長、內部董事席次比例越高，則高階經理人薪酬上升幅度較大，敏感度下降程度也較大。 In 2005, Securities and Futures Bureau in Taiwan announced the amendments about the disclosure guidelines of public companies. The original regulation is that companies should disclose the compensation information of top managers and board directors in detail. In the revision, companies just have to divide the compensation to several levels and disclose the number of executives in each level. In this study, we want to investigate the effect of these amendments on the executives’ compensation level and the sensitivity between compensation and performance. This study chooses the companies in Taiwan electronic industry from 2002 to 2008 as the sample data. The empirical analysis result shows that, after the guidelines have been changed, the compensation level of executives is significantly higher, and the sensitivity between compensation and performance is dropped significantly. Furthermore, we analyze this relationship from the view of board characteristics. The result shows that the stronger the board’s monitoring abilities, the less increase of the executive compensation and the less the reduction of sensitivity between compensation and performance.
