股權結構與投資現金流量敏感度之關係;The relationship between ownership structure and investment cash flow sensitivity

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题名:	股權結構與投資現金流量敏感度之關係;The relationship between ownership structure and investment cash flow sensitivity
作者:	張育慈;Zhang,Yu-ci
贡献者:	企業管理研究所
关键词:	侵占效果;誘因效果;投資現金流量敏感度;the investment cash flow sensitivity;the entrenchment effect;the incentive effect
日期:	2012-07-08
上传时间:	2012-09-11 19:01:54 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學
摘要:	股權結構集中的國家較容易產生控制股東與少數股東的核心代理問題，而控制股東持股集中會帶來兩個效果，分別是侵占效果與誘因效果，本研究主要是探討股權集中的侵占效果與誘因效果對投資現金流量敏感度的影響，研究結果顯示控制股東的現金流量權與控制權偏離得越嚴重，即侵占效果越嚴重，其投資現金流量敏感度越高;而控制股東現金流量權越大，即誘因效果越強，則投資現金流量敏感度則越低。此外，還發現控制權大於30%的研究樣本，投資現金流量敏感度越高。It is easier for countries with concentrated ownership structure to produce the core agency problem of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. When the controlling shareholder holds a high degree of ownership may cause two effects, the entrenchment effect and the incentive effect. The aim of this study is to examine the sensitivity between the entrenchment effect and the effect of incentives and investment cash flow. The result of this research has shown that when the control rights over shareholders overwhelm the cash flow rights. On the other hand, when cash flow rights overwhelm the control rights, the incentive effect becomes greater and the sensitivity of the cash flow. In addition, when control rights account over more than 30%, the sensitivity of investment cash flow increase.
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