由於「自結損益制度」為我國財政部證期會為降低公司內外部資訊不對稱情形，及為投資人提供更及時性資訊所頒布的重要法規。本研究首先調查「自結損益制度」自民國九十一年至民國九十九年實施狀況，並探討自結盈餘是否有助於降低外部資訊使用者資訊不對稱。本研究以財務分析師盈餘預測之角度，分析自結盈餘發布對降低外部資訊使用者資訊不對稱之關聯，以台灣上市(櫃)公司民國九十一年至民國九十九年財務分析師預測為樣本，主要發現如下:首先，自結盈餘發布後，確實有助於財務分析師降低預測誤差，但對於降低預測離散程度，並不顯著。由於自民國九十四年自結盈餘由「強制性公告」轉為「自願性公告」，因此本研究另以民國九十四年為區隔，探討「強制性公告自結盈餘」與「自願性公告自結盈餘」對財務分析師降低預測誤差與離散程度之影響。結果發現，法規修改為「自願性公告」後，發布自結盈餘之公司數量驟減，但準確度大幅度提升，顯著影響並降低財務分析師預測誤差及離散程度，「強制性公告」則對財務分析師預測誤差及離散程度皆無顯著影響。The main purpose of this study is to examine the influence of unaudited earnings on analysts’ forecast. We investigate whether unaudited earnings can help external information users to reduce information asymmetry. This study also examined the relationship between unaudited earnings and analysts’ judgment. According to the analysts’ forecasted data from year 2002 to 2010 in Taiwan security market, the main results of this study are as follows: First, unaudited earnings could reduce analysts’ forecast error but couldn’t reduce analysts’ forecast dispersion degree. Secondly, voluntary unaudited earnings could significantly reduce analysts’ forecast error and forecast dispersion degree, but mandatory unaudited earnings couldn’t.
