本研究探討中國股權分置改革對中國上市公司投資與融資決策造成的影響，並分成下列幾類公司：國有公司、境內法人控制公司和境外法人控制公司，分析不同種類股權結構之投資行為是否有所差異。此外，本研究進一步將國有公司分為中央政府控制公司和地方政府控制公司。本研究以2003年至2011年間在深圳及上海交易所之上市公司為研究對象，利用OLS迴歸模型進行檢驗。結果指出，股權分置改革，對於中國上市公司存在正向影響，導致投資和現金流量敏感度之U形曲線變平緩，而國有公司亦是如此。其中，股權分置改革對地方政府控制公司之政治傾向的過度投資問題減緩，對中央政府控制公司沒有影響。境內法人控制公司在改革後，引發投資不足問題，境外法人控制公司則沒有受到改革影響。本研究亦探討中國股權分置改革對融資來源是否產生影響。研究發現，地方政府控制公司投資時，會傾向由股票市場來融資，而中央政府控制公司則減少由股票市場融資，反而更依賴負債融資。境內法人控制公司減少負債融資依賴性，境外法人控制公司則沒有顯著差異。 The study investigates the impact of split share structure reform on firms’ investment-cash flow sensitivity. Sample firms are divided into: state-owned, legal person -controlled and foreign institution investor-controlled firms. State-owned firms are separated into central government-controlled firms and local government-controlled firms. Our sample includes all companies listed on the Shenzhen and the Shanghai Stock Exchanges during the years 2003-2011 and OLS regression models are utilized to analyze the impact of split share structure reform. The results indicate that the split share structure reform has a positive impact and specifically, on state-owned firms, resulting in a flatter U-shaped curve. For local government-controlled firms, split share structure reform could mitigate the overinvestment problem. However, we do not find a significant influence on central government-controlled firms. For legal person-controlled firms, underinvestment problem becomes more serious following split share structure reform. We also investigate whether there are differences for firms’ financing channel following split share structure reform. The results show that local government-controlled firms are likely to rely more on the capital from stock markets after split share structure reform. However, central government-controlled firms are likely to rely more on debt financing and less on equity financing to support their investments after reform. Legal person controlled-firms are less likely to rely on debt financing for investment. There is no significant difference in investment-cash flow sensitivity between per-reform and post-reform periods for foreign institutional investor-controlled firms.
