本文主要從多重大股東觀點，檢視所有權結構與超額現金價值之關係，並且加入股權分置改革之影響。本文以2003年到2011年中國上市公司為研究樣本，研究發現具有多重大股東之企業超額現金價值較高。在不同所有權結構下，國有企業的非國有多重大股東對超額現金價值沒有顯著影響。細分樣本為境內與境外法人時，發現境內法人會降低超額現金價值，境外法人則會提高超額現金價值；而非國有企業的政府多重大股東則會降低超額現金價值。最後，股權分置改革前後多重大股東對超額現金價值沒有顯著的影響力。本文亦細分各多重大股東身分別做一步檢視，發現股權分置改革會使境內法人對公司超額現金價值提高，在境外法人、中央政府與地方政府則不顯著。顯示在投資人保護環境較弱的中國，多重大股東扮演相當程度的監督角色，降低自由現金流量的代理問題，尤其是當大股東身份為境外法人時，其監督效能大於境內法人；其次，股權分置改革提高境內法人的監督誘因，顯示股權分置強化了公司治理效能。 This research examines the relationship between the multiple large shareholders and the value of corporate excess cash holdings as well as the impact of split share structure reform. The samples are listed company of China from 2003 to 2011. The empirical results indicate that the presence of the multiple large shareholders will increase the value of the excess cash holdings. In the different ownership structure, non-government multiple large shareholders which are in the state-owned company have no significant impact on the value of excess cash holdings. We subdivide samples into domestic large shareholders and foreign large shareholders, the domestic large shareholders will reduce the value of excess cash holdings significantly, and foreign large shareholders will increase the value of excess cash holdings significantly. On the other hand, the government multiple large shareholders which are in the private company will reduce the value of excess cash holdings significantly. Finally, we examine the impact of the split share structure reform. The empirical results indicate that it is no significant effect between the multiple large shareholders and the value of the excess cash holdings. We also subdivide large shareholders into different identity, the domestic shareholders will increase the value of excess cash holdings significantly. However, the foreign shareholders, central government shareholders and local government shareholders don’t have the significant effect. To sum up, our results suggest that multiple large shareholders play a more efficient monitoring role in economies where the institutional environment is weak on protective of minority interests.
