股權結構對權益資金成本的影響─以中國上市公司為例; Ownership structure and cost of equity capital: Evidence from China listed firms

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Title:	股權結構對權益資金成本的影響─以中國上市公司為例;Ownership structure and cost of equity capital: Evidence from China listed firms
Authors:	吳雅婷;Wu,Ya-ting
Contributors:	企業管理學系
Keywords:	股權結構;政治關係;權益資金成本;公司治理;中國;Ownership structure;Political connection;Cost of equity capital;Corporate governance;China
Date:	2013-07-01
Issue Date:	2013-08-22 11:43:22 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	本篇研究以股權結構為主，探討控制股東有無政治關係與權益資金成本的關聯。本研究是依據控制股東不同的動機與誘因進一步分為中央國有企業、地方國有企業、境內法人與境外法人，藉以了解不同控制股東身分別是否會影響權益資金成本。最後，驗證多重大股東是否存在以及其身分別對權益資金成本的影響。本篇以2007年至2011年中國上市公司，共3,669個觀察值進行實證分析。實證結果顯示控制股東有政治關係的公司，如中央國有企業與地方國有企業，其權益資金成本較低；控制股東無政治關係的公司，如境內法人，其權益資金成本較高。再者，公司內部如有多重大股東存在，實證結果顯示多重大股東會與控制股東勾結，權益資金成本較高。不同的第二大股東身分別對權益資金成本的影響也不同，實證研究顯示中央國有企業與境外法人為第二大股東時，能有效監督控制股東，權益資金成本較低；而當地方國有企業與境內法人為第二大股東時，結果顯示會與控制股東勾結，損害少數股東權益，權益資金成本因而較高。 This research first examines whether the firm’s controlling shareholder is politically connected or not may influence its cost of equity capital. Then, we divide the controlling shareholder into four different identities to see if different identities result in different impacts. Finally, we investigate if the existence of multiple large shareholders and its identity affect cost of equity capital. Research sample includes 3,669 observations from 2007 to 2011. Empirical Results show that if the controlling shareholder is politically connected, such as state-owned enterprises affiliated to central government or local government, firms would have a lower cost of equity capital. Firms without political connection, like local institutional investor, result in higher cost of equity capital. Moreover, firms with multiple large shareholders have a higher cost of equity capital. This result indicates that multiple large shareholders may collude with the controlling shareholder. Different second-largest shareholder has different impacts on the cost of equity capital. If the firm’s second-largest shareholder is state-owned enterprises affiliated to central government or foreign institutional investors, they would have a lower cost of equity capital. The result corroborates that they monitor the controlling shareholders well and protect the interests of minority shareholders. If the firm’s second-largest shareholder is state-owned enterprises affiliated to local government or local institutional investor, they would have a higher cost of equity capital. The result suggests that they tend to expropriate minority shareholders.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Business Administration] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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