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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/66095

    Title: 股權分置改革對中國上市公司現金持有的影響;The imapcts of the split share strcuture reform on cash holdings in Chinese listed firms
    Authors: 蔡函芳;Tsai,Han-fang
    Contributors: 企業管理學系
    Keywords: 超額現金;預防動機;代理動機;股權分置改革;Excess cash;Precautionary motive;Agency motive;Split share structure reform
    Date: 2014-10-31
    Issue Date: 2014-11-24 15:20:40 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 本研究檢測股權分置改革如何影響中國上市公司的現金持有。研究樣本包含2001年至2011年的中國上市公司。實證研究指出企業在股權分置改革後會因為預防動機持有現金。然而,公司增加現金持有是為了預防將來的投資機會而非降低財務限制。另外,股權分置改革前,經理人持有現金的代理動機比控制股東低,但股權分置改革後兩者皆下降。將全樣本區分為國家控制及非國家控制企業以比較改革對於現金持有的影響。結果顯示,股權分置改革前,國家控制企業的現金持有的預防動機高於非國家控制企業。改革前後,非國有企業經理人的現金持有代理動機皆高於國有企業。;This study examines how the split share structure reform affects cash holdings in Chinese listed firms. The sample comprises Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 2011. Our empirical results show that firms hold excess cash because of the higher precautionary motive after the reform. However, firms increased cash holdings in order to save for future investment opportunities rather than as a consequence of financial constraints. Furthermore, the agency motive of cash holdings was lower for managers than for controlling shareholders before the reform, and both decreased after the reform. We also divided the whole sample into state-controlled and non-state-controlled firms to compare the impacts of the reform on cash holdings of these two different types of firms. The results show that the precautionary motive for holding cash was higher in state-controlled firms than in non-state-controlled firms before the reform, but became indifferent after the reform. The agency motive of managers for holding excess cash was higher for non-state-controlled firms than for state-controlled firms in both pre-reform and post-reform period.
    Appears in Collections:[企業管理研究所] 博碩士論文

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