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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/66732


    Title: 監督機制、高階經理人激勵薪與企業績效之關聯性
    Authors: 謝宛妘;Hsieh,Wan-Yun
    Contributors: 人力資源管理研究所
    Keywords: 公司治理;監督機制;高階經理人激勵薪;企業績效;Monitoring mechanisms;Incentive compensation;Corporate performance;Corporate governance
    Date: 2015-01-28
    Issue Date: 2015-03-16 15:07:38 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 由於國內外大企業持續發生財務弊案,學術與企業界紛紛重視與檢討公司治理機制,盼能解決公司代理問題,以避免企業倒閉的危機。而解決代理問題有二種解決方式,第一是透過增加高階經理人激勵薪酬的比例,達到激勵的成效,第二是透過良好健全的監督機制,確保高階經理人能朝向企業目標而努力。

    若公司有建立健全的治理機制,管理者將會以最大化公司價值與股東利益為目標,因而可提高公司之經營績效與公司價值。高階經理人激勵薪以及監督機制皆是解決代理問題的方式,此二種方法也可彌補彼此的不足而相輔相成,本研究之目的在於探討公司監督機制、高階經理人的激勵性薪與公司績效三者之間的關係。

    實證結果顯示,監督機制與公司績效大部分呈現正向關係,表示公司監督機制越完善,公司績效越好;高階經理人的激勵薪與公司績效亦呈現正向關係,表示高階經理人激勵薪比例越高,公司績效越好;另外在監督機制與高階經理人激勵薪制度下,皆能使公司績效增加,結果顯示此二機制並無法完全替代。
    ;Due to the worldwide companies have occurred financial scandals continue to occur abroad, academic and business community began to pay attention to the review of corporate governance, the hope of solving the problem the agency problem in order to avoid business failure crisis. There are two effective ways to solve the agency problem. One is using to increase the proportion of incentive compensation to motivate senior managers, the other one is using monitoring mechanism to let senior managers make efforts on business goals.
    The purpose of this study is to focus on the relationship between monitoring mechanisms, incentive compensation for senior managers and corporate performance. The findings of our research are as follows:
    (1) Monitoring mechanisms are positive impact corporate performance.
    (2) Incentive compensation for senior managers are positive impact corporate performance.
    (3) For corporate performance, monitoring mechanisms and incentive compensation for senior managers are not significant substitute relationship.
    Appears in Collections:[人力資源管理研究所] 博碩士論文

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