本研究探討中國國有企業與非國有企業在經營上是否存在差異，分析股權結構與董事會特性對其績效和價值之關係，期能對研究國有企業之領域提供更為完整之證據。實證結果顯示，中國國有企業表現顯著不如非國有企業，原因在於中國國有企業面臨較為複雜的代理問題，受利益掠奪(entrenchment effect)的負面影響大於利益一致(alignment effect)之正面效果。另以董事會特性做為控制變數探討其對中國國有企業經營之影響時，發現在董事會中安排較高比例的獨立董事並無助於公司績效之提升，而由董事長兼任總經理(CEO duality)，亦會對公司績效產生負面影響並損害其價值。;Existing studies have failed to reach the consistent conclusion about the differences in performance between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. A sample of Chinese listed firms is used in this study, providing evidence related to the accounting and market performance of Chinese SOEs. We find that in China non-SOEs perform significantly better than SOEs. In addition, the Chinese SOEs have more complex agency problems and the entrenchment effect seems to dominate the alignment effect for these firms. The findings also suggest that board characteristics including independent directors and CEO duality are detrimental to the performance of the Chinese SOEs.
