中國為世界第二大經濟體，且企業集團為中國貢獻極大產值，本研究欲探討中國企業集團與非企業集團之權益資金成本是否有差異，並進一步分析此種差異是否與國家持股相關，最後檢視國有企業集團中的關係交易，如何顯著影響企業的權益資金成本。本研究樣本囊括中國深圳和上海股票交易所上市公司，樣本的起迄時間為2006年到2013年。以Panel Least Squares迴歸分析與Wald Test分析檢驗假說。實證結果發現：(1) 企業集團的權益資金成本顯著高於非企業集團，顯示因為集團形成的方式與原因不同，中國集團並不符合對於已開發經濟體企業集團的研究發現。(2) 相較於非企業集團，國家持股顯著使企業集團的權益資金成本上升，顯示投資人給予國有企業集團負面的評價。(3) 國有企業集團中的關係交易與權益資金成本呈顯著正相關，顯示關係交易可能淪為國家控制股東進行利益輸送的管道，使投資人面臨較高的剝削風險。希望藉由本研究的發現，提供政策制定者在進行國有集團私有化的參考，並給予企業經營者評估權益融資成本的依據。;Considering China is the second-largest economy in the world, business groups contribute tremendous value of production to China in particular. This study investigates if there is a significant difference in the cost of equity between group-affiliated firms and stand-alone firms. Furthermore, we examine if the difference is related to state ownership. We examine how the existence of related party transactions in state-owned affiliated firms affects the cost of equity of firms. Our sample includes listed companies from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the year 2006 to 2013. We use Panel Least Squares regression analysis and Wald Test analysis to examine hypotheses. Our results are as follows: (1) Group-affiliated firms have a significant higher cost of equity than stand-alone firms. It suggests that business groups in China are not consistent with the finding in developed economies, probably because the way and motivation of forming groups are different from developed economies. (2) State ownership makes the cost of equity of group-affiliated firms significant higher than stand-alone firms. It suggests that investors give state-owned affiliated firms a negative evaluation. (3) Related party transactions are significantly positively related to the cost of equity for state-owned affiliated firms. It suggests that the controlling shareholder in state-owned affiliated firms will use related party transactions to tunnel and therefore investors will assume high risk of expropriation. The implications of this study are to provide policy makers with references to conduct the privatization of business groups, and to give advices to managers for estimating firms’ cost of equity capital.