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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/67493


    Title: 跨境上市與現金持有價值之研究-以中國跨境上市為例;Cross-listing and the value of cash holdings: Evidence from Chinese cross-listed firms
    Authors: 黃明燕;YEN,VONG MINH
    Contributors: 企業管理學系
    Keywords: 跨境上市;現金持有;財務受限;代理問題;公司治理;Cross-listing;Cash holdings;Financial constraints;Agency problems;Corporate governance
    Date: 2015-06-11
    Issue Date: 2015-07-30 19:41:13 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: 本研究透過財務受限與代理問題探討跨境上市對於現金持有價值的影響。以2006年至2013年間中國跨境上市公司為樣本,實證結果發現當考慮財務受限時,跨境上市公司的現金持有價值低於非跨境上市公司。更重要的是,非國有企業的現金持有價值下降的程度比國有企業明顯。當考慮代理問題時,實證結果發現跨境上市公司的現金持有價值高於非跨境上市公司,顯示跨境上市增加現金持有價值透過降低代理問題,符合約束假說,此外,此影響對國有企業比較明顯。最後,實證結果發現在非國有企業財務受限降低的幅度大於代理問題。;This study investigates the effects of cross-listing on the value of cash holdings through financial constraints and agency problems. Using a sample of Chinese cross-listed firms from 2006 to 2013, we find that in consideration of financial constraints, cash holdings is less valuable for cross-listed firms than for non-cross-listed firms. More importantly, the decrease is more pronounced in non-SOEs than in SOEs. Consistent with bonding hypothesis, when we take agency problems into consideration, we find that the value of cash holdings is higher for cross-listed-firms than for non-cross-listed firms suggesting that cross-listing effect increases the value of cash holdings through reducing agency problems. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs. Finally, we find that the effect of reducing financial constraints dominates the effect of reducing agency problems in non-SOEs.
    Appears in Collections:[企業管理研究所] 博碩士論文

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