在控制股東和公司其他利害關係人間的資訊不對稱會引發道德風險以及逆選擇的 問題，進而增加投資人的代理風險。好的公司治理機制，能夠監督管理者並且改善資訊 品質。本篇論文把焦點著重在公司管理當局以及債權人間的代理問題。這篇研究的主要 目的是要探討公司股權結構和負債資金成本間的關係。實證結果發現，最終控制股東所 持有的現金流量權比例和負債資金成本有負向的關係，另外我們也發現，投票權的持有 比例以及投票權對現金流量權的背離程度，兩者皆和負債資金成本有正向的關係。 Information asymmetry between controlling group and other stakeholders will induce moral hazard and adverse selection, which increase the agency risk bearing by investors. Good corporate governance may be a path to monitor the management as well as improve information quality. This paper focuses on the agency problem between management and bondholders. The primary objective of this study is to explore the association between ownership structure and the cost of debt financing. We find that the level of cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling owners is negatively related to the cost of debt. We also find that the level of the divergence between voting and cash flow rights is positively related to the cost of debt financing.
