隨著資本市場的全球化，瞭解企業跨境上市的原因和影響成為日漸重要的課題。本文以1996年至2009年間中國跨港上市公司為樣本，利用非跨港上市之配對樣本與OLS迴歸模型檢驗：（1）跨境上市企業之負債水準是否低於未跨境上市者；（2）跨境上市一段時間後，企業負債水準是否有回升的現象；（3）國有控制程度低的企業之負債水準回升的程度是否大於國有控制程度高的企業。實證結果發現：（1）跨港上市企業之負債水準較非跨港企業低，說明中國跨港上市企業由跨境上市帶來的公司治理效果，對權益代理問題的改善可能比負債代理問題的改善明顯；（2）分別比較跨港上市三年、五年、十年以上與以下的公司，無法看出企業負債水準有回升的現象，反而跨境越久的企業其負債水準較低，說明跨境上市的聲譽提升、流動性增加等權益資金優勢，須經過一段時間後才明顯發揮作用；（3）跨港上市後，國有控制程度低的企業其負債水準回升的程度並未大於國有控制程度高的企業，事實上國有控制程度高的企業依然較依賴負債，此說明中國跨境企業中，對於國家控制程度較高者，國家持股較高更能夠取得負債融資，對於國家控制程度較低者，其負債比率較低，顯示跨境上市可以幫助他們以權益融資方式取得資金；（4）國家持股程度對中國跨港上市公司之負債水準有正向的影響，國家持股程度為造成負債水準差異的重要原因之一。 Understanding the reasons for and the impact of cross-listing has become a more and more important issue with the deepening globalization of capital markets. This study uses samples of Chinese listed companies that choose to cross-list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange between 1996 and 2009 and adopts matched samples method and ordinary least squares analysis to investigate (1) whether the financial leverage level of cross-listed companies is lower than that of non-cross-listed companies; (2) whether the financial leverage level rises after cross-listing for a period of time; (3) whether the financial leverage level of companies whose state ownership is lower rises more than that of companies whose state ownership is higher. The results are as follows. First, the debt ratio of cross-listed firms is lower than that of non-cross-listed firms, because amelioration of corporate governance resulted from cross-listing are more significant on equity agency problems than on debt agency problems. Second, by comparing the firms that cross-listed less and more than 3, 5, 10 years, we can’t find evidence that the leverage level rises. Instead, it appears that firms cross-listed longer have lower debt ratio, showing cross-listing advantages of reputation, liquigity, and so on which are beneficial to equity financing need a period of time to act apparently. Third, after cross-listing, the leverage of firms whose state ownership is lower doesn’t rise more than firms whose state ownership is higher. In fact, companies who have higher state ownership still rely more on debt financing. It states that for Chinese cross-listed firms, those who have higher state ownership can obtain debt financing because of their high state ownership and those who have lower state ownership have lower debt ratio because cross-listing help them get funds through equity financing. Finally, the state ownership has a positive influence on debt ratio of Chinese cross-listed firms. The ratio of state ownership is one of the important causes of financial leverage differences.
