中國政府於2005年實施股權分置改革，期望藉此平衡非流通股東及流通股東的利益，減少控制股東剝奪少數股東財富的誘因。考量以關係人交易作為剝奪及輸送利益的工具，股權分置改革應該對控制股東之關係人交易產生影響。本文針對2002年至2009年間在深圳交易所及上海交易所之上市公司進行研究，利用OLS迴歸模型檢驗，股權分置改革後對以下不同類型的控制股東進行關係人交易之影響：國有、非國有、中央政府、地方政府、境外機構投資人及境內機構投資人；此外，檢測改革前後第二大股東對於控制股東進行關係人交易之影響。實證發現國有控制股東在股權分置改革後減少進行關係人交易的下降幅度比非國有股東多；中央政府在股權分置改革後減少進行關係人交易的下降幅度比地方政府多；第二大股東在非國有控制股東下較能抑制控制股東進行關係人交易。 Chinese government implemented the split share structure reform in 2005, with an attempt to eliminate controlling shareholders’ incentive to expropriate the minority shareholders’ wealth through aligning the interest of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Related party transaction is one of the common ways for tunneling, which might be affected by the split share structure reform. Our sample observations include all companies listed on the Shenzhen and the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the years from 2002 to 2010. The OLS regression models are used to investigate the impact of split share structure reform on related party transitions, considering the following different types of controlling shareholders: state owned, non-state owned, central government, local government, foreign institutional investors and local institutional investors. We also investigate the monitoring effects of the second largest shareholder. The empirical results show that related party transactions are reduced after the split share structure reform, especially in firms controlled by state owned shareholders and central government. Finally, the split share structure reform enhances the monitoring effects of the second largest shareholder in firms controlled by non-state owned shareholders.
